CEPAS WORKSHOP ON ELECTORAL PROCESS IN DR CONGO

Supporting dialogue between civil society organizations on the electoral process in DR Congo

Days 2 & 3 : 50 participants/day

"Supporting dialogue between civil society organizations to harmonize opinion on the holding of elections with or without a transition period in the DRC" is the theme of the three-day workshop organized by CEPAS from Monday 14 to Wednesday, 16, May, 2018, in the twin rooms Henri de Decker and Leon de Saint Moulin of CEPAS.

The second day: deepening of the theses in two working groups...

            The second day of the workshop on the electoral process in DR Congo was devoted to the in-depth examination of the two theses identified during the discussions of the first day, in two different working groups: elections on December 23, 2018, how to get there? (thesis 1); elections after a transition period, what consequences? (thesis 2)

Thesis 1: elections on December 23, 2018, how to get there?       

            The members of this reflecting group had the mission to thoroughly examine the scenario of compliance with the current electoral calendar that provides for legislative and presidential elections in December. 7 strands of analysis guided the reflection:

1. Is it possible, given the current situation, for elections to be held in December 2018?
2. If yes, what are the milestones to be covered by December 2018 and who are the actors involved?
3. When should we start ringing the alarm so as not to be faced with a fait accompli around December?
4. Is a constitutional revision possible or foreseeable during this time? What would such a review be about? What would be the consequences for the appeasement or aggravation of the institutional crisis of legitimacy in which the DRC is plunged? What would be his chances of success (or risks of failure)?
5. What to think of the “voting machine”? What are the possible consequences (technical, logistical, economic, legal, etc.) of its use? Should we use it or not?
6. What if the CENI does not organize the elections on December 23, 2018? Who will be responsible? What will be the penalty? Who will apply it? The CNSA? The SADC? The AU? The UN? Against which institution? According to which prerogatives?
7. What impact would the registration or not of Congolese living abroad have on the current electoral process?           

            The fundamental question to be examined was therefore obvious: are elections possible in December 2018? Yes, responded the proponents of the first thesis, with prerequisites to be met to arrive there safely, including: peace, stability, trust between stakeholders, availability of financial resources, political relaxation, public freedoms, independence of the CENI , whether or not to use the "voting machine", etc.

            However, the proponents of this thesis believe that we must not be fooled. Given the current political situation, it is very likely that elections will not be possible on the date scheduled by the CENI (23 December 2018), if the political will on the part of all stakeholders is not there. In such a case, the civil society would have to press the alarm bell sufficiently in time (by July at the latest), to avoid being caught off guard as the deadline approaches.

Thesis 2: elections after a transition period: what consequences?

1.         Is it possible / relevant to organize a transition without President Kabila?
2.         What would be the duration and mission of this transition?
3.         Who can lead this transition? How will they be designated? Based on what criteria and how to obtain a relative consensus on this?
4.        By what mechanism will such a transition be decided?
5.         And who would do it? CENCO? The African Union and the UN (according to the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation between the DRC and the countries of the Addis Ababa region)? The street, as advocated by citizen movements and some opposition political parties? What is the result so far and its contribution to the electoral process?
6.          What are the risks on the electoral process?
7.         And if the street approach or other mechanisms (national or regional) aimed or resulted in creating a vacuum at the top of the state, who would fill it and how would it?
8.        What fate the proponents of this thesis would like to reserve to the institutions of the Republic (Presidency, Parliament, Government) and the consequences of this option on the security of the country?
1.           What would be the adhesion (actors of all edges and population) to such an approach (so as not to be qualified as non-inclusive)?
2.           What are the possible consequences of such a transition on the consolidation of democracy - and in particular from the point of view of political alternation at the top of the state?

            The proponents of this thesis have started from a double observation that has become obvious: on the one hand, the Majority in power seems to shine with a certain lack of political will to accelerate the electoral process, multiplying subterfuges and alibis to drag on unduly in power. On the other hand, the 2016 New Year's Eve Agreement was not based on sincere national reconciliation or a desire for change shared by all stakeholders in the dialogue facilitated by CENCO. On the contrary, petty agendas have prevailed over the best interests of the nation, torpedoing the dialogue from upstream to downstream ... This double observation is thus at the root of the lack of confidence that undermines the current electoral process: all the actors look at each other in earthenware dogs, suspecting each other.

            A transition, led by civil society actors, is needed to establish national reconciliation and prepare credible and democratic elections. It goes without saying, they pointed out, that this transition should put aside the current institutions responsible for the electoral delay and the gloom of the current socio-political situation: Presidency of the Republic, Parliament, Government ...

            Naturally, such an approach, as noted by the group, if it is not well developed and conducted with prudence and wisdom, contains significant risks, including: insecurity, instability, unconstitutionality, possible civil war, balkanization of the country, humanitarian and social crisis, etc. What to do then? It would be necessary to deepen this question more in order to set up an approach which would meet a broad adhesion of the people and which would disturb less the social peace which, recognized the proponents of the thesis, is not already pink. Suggestions were made on the format of such a transition (facilitators, duration, mandate).

Finally, it should be noted that the facilitators of the transition would not be candidates for the elections they will have been responsible for preparing.

Third day of the workshop: plenary and possible conciliation of the two theses ...

             Can we reconcile the two seemingly contradictory arguments? This was the task of the last day of the workshop, after listening to the arguments of each thesis.

            The plenary found that basically the proponents of both theses all want the same thing: credible elections, in a peaceful climate. Indeed, it is the best interests of the nation that should take precedence over the personal and often selfish ambitions of political actors.

            After a time of debate where each thesis was again analyzed by the plenary, a middle way emerged: the holding of free, democratic and transparent elections on December 23 should be the priority of civil society as a whole .

            However, taking advantage of the lessons of the country's recent history, civil society must remain on permanent alert and become "proactive" rather than "reactive" like the last two years.

            Clearly, it is a question of exerting permanent pressure on the institutions responsible for organizing elections so that they are held on the date set by the electoral calendar. In this sense, obstacles that still stand in the way of the electoral process will have to be examined quickly.

            Nevertheless, if the civil society realizes that the elections become hypothetical (since the milestones have not been respected, for example) and that we are heading to another report, it should immediately sound the alarm and initiate a series of advocacies for the current political leaders to be held responsible for this umpteenth electoral failure.

            To put it another way, according to the representatives of civil society who took part in the CEPAS workshop on the current electoral process, the holding of free, democratic and transparent elections on December 23rd remains a priority to defend. . The milestones that lead to it must be constantly and scrupulously examined to avoid any bad surprise. In the event that elections are to be postponed again, civil society has the duty to launch an advocacy with national and international partners to propose a suitable exit plan of crisis, which takes into account the responsibility of the failure of the process to be established.

            Finally, CEPAS, the organizer of the brainstorming workshop, announced that the results will be shared with political actors and other structures of civil society to maintain dialogue between different actors involved in the ongoing electoral process. . DR Congo is a heritage common to all Congolese, always reminds Le Potentiel (Congolese Daily); it is therefore up to all to struggle and make it a space where life is good for all his sons and daughters.

Alain NZADI-a-NZADI, sj

Managing Director of  CEPAS and Chief Editor of Congo-Afrique review